Human dignity. A concept that has been critical to the study of bioethics because of its complex nature. It has been asked whether this concept is useful in bioethics wherein it sheds important light on the whole range of bioethical issues. This usefulness may encompass the ethical values from embryo research to biomedical enhancement and to care of the disabled and those who are dying. On the other hand, some argue about its uselessness. They argue that the concept of human dignity is useless because it is vague and they believe that this is just a slogan that hides the unpersuasive arguments and unstated biases. In view of this, it is good to address the question of human dignity and its proper place in bioethics.
According to the Encyclopedia of Bioethics, human dignity is defined as “an attribute of all human beings that establishes their great significance or worth.” This means that human beings should be recognized as worthy of esteem or respect. In addition, a Guest Commentary in Ethics & Medicine concludes that human dignity is: “The exalted moral status which every being of human origin uniquely possesses.” These definitions of human dignity are rooted from two different perspectives. One of which is the idea that human dignity is an intrinsic aspect of human beings, the result of being created in the image of God: “Human beings are constituted by their bearing the divine image (imago Dei), and from that fundamental fact flows their unique and inviolable dignity as persons.” This perspective only presents the fact that human dignity is not an acquired status but an inherited one. Kant supports this view because he believes that “dignity is the intrinsic worth that belongs to all human beings and to no other beings in the natural world. All men possess dignity because of their rational autonomy”. The other view states that human dignity is rooted in capacities, in what humans can do. This means then that human beings can be reduced to performance, and dignity can be gained or lost according to ability.
These different aspects of human dignity have brought problems in understanding the real place of this concept in bioethical issues. Human dignity, most often than not, intercept in many ethical problems such as beginning-of-life and end-of-life. In particular, in the ethical caregiving at the end of life, the concept of human dignity comes in. For example, an elderly is diagnosed with early fatal disease and facing an unstoppable decline into dependency. In this particular situation, the question of human dignity is: is it morally acceptable for this patient to stop taking his medicine in the hope of a faster death, one less painful to himself and his family? There are many possible answers to this ethical dilemma. One of which is that, this is morally permissible because this patient wants to give up medication and allow his disease to carry him off in a ‘more dignified and humane way’. This means that this patient don’t want to be humiliated in such a way that he becomes a burden to his family. The other answer would be: this is morally impermissible because choosing to hasten the end of one's life is contrary to the ‘equal dignity and respect owed to all human life’.
In the beginning-of-life issue, the problem of human dignity arises. For example, a premature baby is critically ill who is likely to survive but will suffer from severe mental defects. In this example, the problem of permissibility to exercise medical interventions to save the life of the child should be addressed. One answer could be: it is wrong to bring a person into the world who will just suffer from lifelong mental incapacity because human dignity is said to be rested on higher mental capacities. Since the baby will suffer from mental defects, he/she will not be able to exercise his/her human dignity. On the other hand, some would say that medical interventions should be taken because according to them, equal human dignity forbids everyone to declare some lives even said to be ‘not worth living’.
With these conflicting beliefs about how human dignity should be understood, many bioethical issues remain unsolved. I believe that the concept of human dignity is superfluous. In the issues of beginning-of life and end-of-life, the question of what constitute a human being should be answered first. However, I still believe that this concept is still possible to be utilized in the manner in which it is used as the essential and inviolable core of our humanity (after establishing the real definition of human being or a human life).